Wirecard: Are shareholder lawsuits a fool’s errand?

Ver­si­on in Deutsch Eng­lish

A num­ber of more or less well-known Ger­man class action lawy­ers have­fi­led lawsuits against Wire­card AG, its Manage­ment Board mem­bers and its audi­tors. Lawsuits against the Ger­man Federal Finan­cial Super­vi­so­ry Aut­ho­ri­ty (Bafin) have been announ­ced. It is appar­ent­ly part of the busi­ness model of the­se firms to posi­ti­on them­sel­ves in the media at an ear­ly sta­ge in order to acqui­re cli­ents. Howe­ver, the pro­spects of the­se lawsuits are eit­her doubt­ful, or it is unclear whe­ther the defen­dants will be able to pay at all. In most cases, the­re is no immedia­te risk of claims beco­m­ing time-bar­red. Inves­tors should the­re­fo­re not rush into expen­si­ve man­da­tes. Man­da­tes that have alrea­dy been gran­ted can in some cases even be revo­ked without adver­se cost consequences.

Suing Wirecard AG

A lawsu­it against Wire­card AG its­elf appears fair­ly pro­mi­sing, albeit only from a pure­ly legal point of view. It would appe­ar that balan­ce she­ets from pre­vious years were in fact incor­rect and ad hoc noti­fi­ca­ti­ons were incor­rect or delay­ed. Howe­ver, Wire­card AG has lost (or has never had) almost its ent­i­re equi­ty capi­tal after the unco­vering of fake trust accounts. This does not even take into account wri­te-downs on the value of sub­si­dia­ries that have been acqui­red under dubio­us cir­cum­s­tan­ces. Inco­me from cur­rent ope­ra­ti­ons is obvious­ly not suf­fi­ci­ent to repay exis­ting debt. This is why Wire­card AG has filed for insolvency.

In an insol­ven­cy, inves­tor claims for dama­ges are ordi­na­ry unse­cu­red claims. Inves­tors can­not count on recei­ving any mea­ning­ful payout. Claims that have alrea­dy been filed will be bar­red for the time being as soon as insol­ven­cy pro­cee­dings are ope­ned. It would the­re­fo­re be non­sen­si­cal to file a lawsu­it now, and inves­tors who have alrea­dy filed a lawsu­it should con­si­der with­drawing their lawsu­it in order to at least save some legal cos­ts. Howe­ver, aggrie­ved inves­tors should file their claims with the trus­tee if insol­ven­cy pro­cee­dings are opened.

Suing members of the Board of Management

Lawsuits against indi­vi­du­al mem­bers of the Board of Manage­ment, in par­ti­cu­lar against the CEO, Mr. Braun, or the CFO, Mr. Mar­sa­lek, also appe­ar to be rea­son­ab­ly pro­mi­sing, albeit again only in pure­ly legal terms. At least accord­ing to what has been repor­ted in the press so far. Howe­ver, here again, the ques­ti­on ari­ses whe­ther the­se deb­tors have suf­fi­ci­ent­ly lar­ge assets. In the case of Mr. Mar­sa­lek, the fact that he is cur­r­ent­ly on the run makes reco­vering money even more dif­fi­cult. Whe­ther offi­cers of Wire­card AG have insuran­ce cover under a D&O poli­cy for bre­ach of duty giving rise to lia­bi­li­ty will depend on whe­ther they knowin­gly breached their duties. The con­tent and scope of any insuran­ce poli­ci­es are not yet known. Howe­ver, it is likely that their insuran­ce cover will not app­ly in this case, as they have likely acted knowin­gly. In any case, the facts are not clear. The­re­fo­re, a lawsu­it is not necessa­ri­ly appro­pria­te in this case eit­her. Con­se­quent­ly, inves­tors are bet­ter advi­sed to wait until more details beco­me known.

The sta­tu­te of limi­ta­ti­ons should not yet be a pro­blem in most cases. Claims for dama­ges will beco­me time-bar­red three years after the end of the year in which the claim aro­se and in which the credi­tor beco­mes awa­re of the cir­cum­s­tan­ces giving rise to the claim and the iden­ti­ty of the deb­tor, or should have beco­me awa­re of them without gross negli­gence. Without such know­ledge of the credi­tor, they will beco­me sta­tu­te-bar­red after ten years. For most claims the­re is the­re­fo­re no rea­son to act in order due to a sta­tu­to­ry a limi­ta­ti­on period.

Suing the auditors (Ernst & Young)

The­re are spe­cu­la­ti­ons in the press about negli­gent or gross­ly negli­gent con­duct by the audi­tors of Wire­card AG. Howe­ver, claims by the com­pa­ny against the audi­tors of a stock cor­po­ra­ti­on are limi­ted to four mil­li­on euros in the event of negli­gent con­duct. This inclu­des gross­ly negli­gent con­duct. In princip­le, an audi­tor is not liable to third par­ties (i.e. also to share­hol­ders) in the case of negli­gent con­duct alo­ne. The situa­ti­on may be dif­fe­rent if the­re is a con­tract with pro­tec­ti­ve effect for third par­ties. Howe­ver, this is only the case in excep­tio­nal cases. The­re is no rea­son for this here.

Knowledge or Intent

The situa­ti­on is dif­fe­rent in the case of will­ful or inten­tio­nal action. In this case, lia­bi­li­ty towards third par­ties ari­sing from the vio­la­ti­on of various sta­tu­to­ry duties (§ 823 para. 2 of the Ger­man Civil Code (BGB) and due to inflic­ting inten­tio­nal harm in bad faith (§ 826 BGB) comes into play. The limits on lia­bi­li­ty will not app­ly eit­her. Howe­ver, it will be dif­fi­cult to pro­ve wil­ful­ness or intent. It can be assu­med that Ernst & Young will do ever­ything pos­si­ble to refu­te the accu­sa­ti­on of inten­tio­nal con­duct. Even if this does not suc­ceed, only the acting audi­tors and the GmbH, which has a share capi­tal of appro­xi­mate­ly ten mil­li­on euros, will be liable. This will hard­ly be enough to satisfy all the claims of investors.

Insurance cover

A pos­si­ble lia­bi­li­ty insuran­ce will likely not pay in case of intent or will­ful mis­con­duct. This is becau­se pro­fes­sio­nal lia­bi­li­ty insuran­ce usual­ly does not app­ly whe­re the insu­red knowin­gly defaults on a duty.  This will most likely be the case if lia­bi­li­ty can be based on will­ful mis­con­duct or intent.

Liability of other companies in the Ernst & Young network

It is very doubt­ful whe­ther and to what extent the­re is a basis for going after any of the nume­rous legal­ly inde­pen­dent com­pa­nies of the Ernst & Young Group in the rest of the world. A num­ber of law firms have appar­ent­ly filed cri­mi­nal char­ges against indi­vi­du­al employees of Ernst & Young GmbH on behalf of aggrie­ved inves­tors. This cer­tain­ly makes sen­se in view of the facts known so far, espe­cial­ly sin­ce the (Germn) tax­payer is paying for the investigation .

Howe­ver, once again it is still too ear­ly to file cos­t­ly lawsuits. And once again, aggrie­ved inves­tors should wait until the facts beco­me clearer.

Suing Bafin or the review panel commissioned by it

At least Bafin is cer­tain­ly sol­vent. Accord­ing to press reports, Bafin saw rea­son to inves­ti­ga­te alle­ga­ti­ons at Wire­card as ear­ly as Febru­a­ry 2019 wit­hin the scope of its secu­ri­ties moni­to­ring remit. It com­mis­sio­ned the Ger­man Finan­cial Repor­ting Review Panel (FREP) to do so. Howe­ver, it appears that only a sin­gle audi­tor was acti­ve the­re. A report has not yet been issued. Inde­ed, pur­suant to Sec­tion 106 of the Ger­man Secu­ri­ties Tra­ding Act (WpHG), it is the task of the Federal Finan­cial Super­vi­so­ry Aut­ho­ri­ty (Bafin) to audit the annu­al finan­cial state­ments of lis­ted com­pa­nies if the­re are spe­ci­fic indi­ca­ti­ons of irre­gu­la­ri­ties. The most recent finan­cial state­ments can also be audi­ted without any par­ti­cu­lar rea­son. For this pur­po­se, it may make use of exter­nal review bodies, and the FREP is one such body. It is the­re­fo­re qui­te pos­si­ble that Bafin or FREP may be char­ged with a bre­ach of duty. But this can­not be dedu­ced with cer­tain­ty from the facts known to date.

Suing Bafin

Suing BaFin in con­nec­tion with fal­se or mis­lea­ding ad hoc announ­ce­ments will most pro­bab­ly fail becau­se the rele­vant Art. 17 of the Mar­ket Abu­se Ordi­nan­ce (MAR) is not con­si­de­red be for the pro­tec­tion of third par­ties. In addi­ti­on, any lia­bi­li­ty of Bafin to indi­vi­du­al inves­tors (at least accord­ing to the cur­rent legal posi­ti­on) is also exclu­ded becau­se the acti­vi­ties of Bafin are deemed  to be car­ri­ed out sole­ly in the public inte­rest, accord­ing to § 4 para. 4 of the Finan­cial Ser­vices Super­vi­si­on Act (Fin­DAG). This means that the­re are no offi­cial duties towards inves­tors from which any lia­bi­li­ty could be derived.

It is unclear whe­ther it is pos­si­ble to extend the offi­cial duties of Bafin at least par­ti­al­ly to indi­vi­du­al inves­tors by invo­king EU direc­ti­ves or regu­la­ti­ons, and what actu­al con­se­quen­ces this would have. In Febru­a­ry 2020, the Frank­furt Hig­her Regio­nal Court (OLG), which is the com­pe­tent appeals court for actions against Bafin, rejec­ted any third-par­ty pro­tec­tion for sur­veil­lan­ce obli­ga­ti­ons in the con­text of ban­king super­vi­si­on. In doing so, it refer­red to ear­lier decisi­ons of the Euro­pean court of jus­ti­ce. Of cour­se, this gives only very limi­ted gui­d­ance on ques­ti­ons of capi­tal mar­ket super­vi­si­on. Whe­ther and to what extent the­re is third-par­ty pro­tec­tion impo­sed by capi­tal mar­ket law direc­ti­ves or regu­la­ti­ons in EU law that can have an impact on Ger­man law, I will dis­cuss in a fur­ther arti­cle. This is the cen­tral issue with respect to any lia­bi­li­ty of Bafin to investors.

Suing the review panel

Under Sec­tion 342b (7) of the Ger­man Com­mer­cial Code (HGB), FREP is liable for dama­ges resul­ting from its audi­t­ing acti­vi­ties only in case if intent or will­ful mis­con­duct. Neit­her is appa­rent from the facts known to date. In addi­ti­on, it is unclear to what extent FREP would be able to pay sub­stan­ti­al amounts of dama­ges at all.

Conclusion

To con­clu­de, for all pos­si­ble Wire­card lawsuits it is eit­her unclear whe­ther they can be suc­cess­ful­ly enfor­ced in case of a win or the­re are con­si­derable doubts about their legal merits. Or both app­ly. In most cases the­re is no immedia­te thre­at of claims beco­m­ing time-bar­red. Aggrie­ved inves­tors should the­re­fo­re not take legal action pre­ma­tu­re­ly, but rather wait and see how the Wire­card saga con­ti­nues, in order to be able to bet­ter balan­ce the pro­spects of eco­no­mic suc­cess and the cost risk.

If a law firm has alrea­dy been man­da­ted (in par­ti­cu­lar one who sys­te­ma­ti­cal­ly soli­ci­ts cli­ents via the Inter­net), a revo­ca­ti­on of the man­da­te may still be pos­si­ble under the pro­vi­si­ons of the Ger­man Civil Code on distance con­tracts (§§ 312 c ff. BGB). If a con­tract for legal ser­vices is con­clu­ded without per­so­nal con­ta­ct through distance sel­ling (tele­pho­ne, e‑mail, Inter­net), the cli­ent, if she is a con­su­mer, can revo­ke the con­tract if he has not been pro­per­ly infor­med of his right of revo­ca­ti­on. A revo­ca­ti­on is always pos­si­ble wit­hin the two-week revo­ca­ti­on peri­od. Without express con­sent, the lawy­er may also not act befo­re the end of the revo­ca­ti­on peri­od. In the event of an valid revo­ca­ti­on, the obli­ga­ti­on to pay a fee does not app­ly. Howe­ver, most iclass action lawy­ers are awa­re of this and have addres­sed it in their man­da­te agreements.

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